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Neutralizing the Adverse
Industry Impacts of CO2
Abatement Policies
What Does It Cost?
A. Lans Bovenberg and Lawrence H. Goulder
2.1 Introduction
Most studies of U.S. CO2 abatement policies have focused on the aggre-
gate costs and beneﬁts of these initiatives. Yet the desirability and political
feasibility of these policies tend to hinge critically on their distributional
impacts. A full assessment of CO2 abatement options therefore requires
attention to distributional impacts.
Some studies—including Poterba (1991), Bull, Hassett, and Metcalf
(1994), Schillo et al. (1996), and Metcalf (1998)—have focused on the dis-
tribution of impacts of CO2 abatement policies across household income
groups. In these papers, the instrument for CO2 abatement is usually a car-
bon tax. This tax is generally found to produce a regressive impact, al-
though this impact is fairly small, especially when one ranks households
by measures of lifetime income (such as expenditure) rather than by an-
nual income (which includes transitory shocks and lifetime variations that
make annual income a bad indicator of permanent income). Moreover, as
indicated by Schillo et al. (1996) and Metcalf (1998), the government can
reduce the regressive eﬀect by lowering personal income tax rates at the
bottom end of the income scale and by raising public transfers.
A second important distributional dimension is the variation in impacts
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45across industries. CO2 abatement policies such as carbon taxes or carbon
quotas can reduce net output prices in the fossil fuel (carbon supplying)
industries and raise costs in industries that intensively employ fossil fuels
as inputs. These price and cost impacts have the potential to seriously
harm proﬁts, employment, and equity values. The distribution of impacts
along these dimensions crucially inﬂuences political feasibility, since rep-
resentatives of fossil fuel producers carry signiﬁcant weight in the political
process.1 CO2 abatement policies that pose serious burdens on these indus-
tries may stand little chance of political survival.2
This paper explores the distributional impacts of various U.S. CO2
abatement policies in terms of their impacts on proﬁts and equity values
for the industries supplying fossil fuels (the coal industry and crude petro-
leum and natural gas industry) and the industries that rely heavily on fossil
fuels as intermediate inputs (e.g., petroleum reﬁning and electric utilities).
We examine a range of abatement policies, including policies designed to
avoid adverse consequences for the regulated industries. As discussed later,
some of the adverse consequences can be avoided through industry-spe-
ciﬁc corporate tax cuts, direct transfers, and the government’s free provi-
sion (or “grandfathering”)3 of emissions permits to ﬁrms. A main purpose
of our paper is to assess the eﬃciency cost of avoiding adverse impacts
through such policies.
To perform this investigation we employ an intertemporal general equi-
librium model of the United States.4 The general equilibrium framework
1. Indeed, the industry-distribution impacts may be more important politically than the
household-distribution impacts, since the stakes for each ﬁrm from these policies are high,
while the impacts of abatement policies on households, although important in the aggregate,
are fairly small for each individual household. Under these circumstances, aﬀe c t e dﬁ r m sm a y
be more willing to incur the costs of political mobilization than aﬀected households are. This
discussion invokes the notion of political mobilization bias, an idea originated by Olson
(1965). For a discussion of this bias and other political transactions cost issues, see William-
son (1996). For an analysis of the implications of political mobilization bias for legislators’
choice of environmental policy instruments, see Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins (1998). For a
general discussion of political resistance to market-based environmental policy instruments,
see Pezzey (1988).
2. This will be the case irrespective of the eﬃciency properties of abatement policies. In
the real world, winners often cannot compensate losers through costless, lump-sum transfers.
Hence the most eﬃcient policies—those with the largest net beneﬁts in the aggregate—may
not yield actual Pareto improvements: They may only be potentially Pareto-improving. In
such a world, political feasibility may require designing policies that avoid serious negative
impacts on key stakeholders. This may involve a sacriﬁce of some of the eﬃciency gains from
the most eﬃcient policy.
3. Grandfathering is a special case of free provision. It is a legal rule whereby “old” entities
(e.g., ﬁrms subject to previous environmental rules) are exempt from new regulatory require-
ments and remain bound only to the earlier (and perhaps more lax) regulatory provisions.
Under grandfathering, the free provision of permits is linked to current production factors.
Newly entering ﬁrms are not eligible for a free provision, and investments in new capital are
not rewarded.
4. This is the same model as that in Goulder (1995a) and Bovenberg and Goulder (1996,
1997), with some extensions to allow for attention to the industry-speciﬁc revenue-recycling
and tradable-permits provisions described below.
46 A. Lans Bovenberg and Lawrence H. Goulderis especially useful for assessing the incidence of carbon policies. Nearly
all of the studies of distributional impacts of carbon policies have em-
ployed a partial equilibrium framework that ignores behavioral responses
to environmental taxes.5 These studies impose exogenous incidence as-
sumptions and cannot analyze how behavioral responses aﬀect pollution,
eﬃciency, and distribution. An applied general equilibrium analysis, in
contrast, derives tax incidence endogenously from the model-generated
behavioral responses. An important distributional consideration is the im-
pact of CO2 abatement policies on returns to labor and capital. A general
equilibrium framework is appropriate for this purpose, since it captures
important links between energy markets and factor markets. The model
used here is especially useful in this regard because it incorporates
forward-looking investment behavior and the adjustment costs associated
with the installation or removal of physical capital. These features enable
us to consider the capitalization eﬀects of unanticipated policies.6 Most
other general equilibrium models treat capital as perfectly mobile, and
thus they cannot successfully examine impacts on proﬁts or equity values.
In such models, the impacts on industries are measured largely in terms of
the eﬀects on outputs. The results from this paper show that output eﬀects
are unreliable indicators of distributional eﬀects.
Earlier analyses of CO2 abatement policies reveal a tension between pro-
moting economic eﬃciency, on the one hand, and avoiding serious adverse
distributional consequences to key industries, on the other. Goulder, Parry,
and Burtraw (1997), Farrow (1999), Fullerton and Metcalf (1998), and
Parry, Williams, and Goulder (1999) show that policies that raise revenues
and use these revenues to ﬁnance cuts in preexisting distortionary taxes
have lower costs than policies that do not generate and recycle revenues in
this way. The diﬀerences in the costs of the two types of policies can be
large enough to determine whether the overall eﬃciency impact—environ-
ment-related beneﬁts minus economy-wide costs of abatement—is positive
or negative.7 Yet the latter, less eﬃcient policies impose a smaller ﬁnancial
burden on the regulated industries because they do not charge ﬁrms for
every unit of their pollution.8 These considerations suggest a conﬂict be-
5. An exception is Jorgenson, Slesnick, and Wilcoxen (1992).
6. Our model does not incorporate adjustment costs for industry-speciﬁc labor; indeed,
labor is perfectly mobile across industries. To the extent that labor faces adjustment costs,
one should explore capitalization eﬀects on labor along lines similar to this paper’s explora-
tion of such eﬀects on capital.
7. Parry, Williams, and Goulder (1999) show that while a carbon tax with revenues recy-
cled through cuts in marginal income tax rates produces eﬃciency gains, reducing CO2 emis-
sions through a system of freely provided (grandfathered) CO2 permits may be an eﬃciency-
reducing proposition: For any level of emissions reduction, the environmental beneﬁts will
fall short of society’s costs of abatement!
8. Two revenue-raising policies are an emissions tax and a system of auctioned emissions
permits, where the permits are initially auctioned. Under these policies, ﬁrms endure costs
of emissions abatement and, for whatever emissions they continue to produce, must either
pay a tax or purchase permits. In contrast, under a system of freely provided emissions
Neutralizing Adverse Industry Impacts of CO2 Abatement Policies 47permits requiring equivalent emissions reductions, ﬁrms endure the same costs of abatement
but do not pay for remaining emissions. Hence, the burden on polluting ﬁrms is smaller.
9. Buchanan and Tullock (1975) pointed out that environmental policies can generate sig-
niﬁcant rents to ﬁrms to the extent that such policies cause output to be restricted. They
showed that because of such rents, regulated ﬁrms can experience higher proﬁts than in the
absence of regulation. Our ﬁndings in this paper are consistent with Buchanan and Tullock’s
analysis. Fullerton and Metcalf (1998) emphasize the importance of rents to the overall eﬃ-
ciency costs of policies to reduce pollution. They indicate that eﬃciency costs are substan-
tially higher under policies producing rents that are not taxed away, in comparison with pol-
icies that do not produce rents that are left in private hands. A parallel line of investigation
was conducted by Goulder, Parry, and Burtraw (1997), who show that policies that fail to
tax away rents are at a disadvantage in terms of eﬃciency because they fail to generate
revenues that can be used to reduce preexisting distortionary taxes. Such policies thus fail
to exploit an eﬃciency-enhancing revenue-recycling eﬀect. In the present study, we examine
the extent to which policy-generated rents aﬀect the impacts of CO2 abatement policies on
the proﬁtability and equity values of regulated ﬁrms.
10. Correspondingly, if the government were to freely allocate 100 percent of the emissions
permits, or exempt 100 percent of inframarginal emissions from the base of a carbon tax, it
would generate substantial windfalls to ﬁrms: The rents produced and enjoyed by producers
would be many times larger than the income losses otherwise attributable to the policy. The
government does not need to be nearly this generous in order to safeguard ﬁrms’ proﬁts and
equity values. Our focus on the use of inframarginal exemptions to accomplish distributional
objectives is in the spirit of Farrow (1999), who employs a model along the lines of Bovenberg
tween eﬃciency and political feasibility: The eﬃcient policy—the carbon
tax—appears less politically acceptable because it puts too much of a bur-
den on politically mobilized, fossil fuel industries, while the politically
more acceptable policy of grandfathered carbon (or CO2) permits involves
serious ineﬃciencies.
The present study ﬁnds that the choice between eﬃciency and insulating
proﬁts of key industrial stakeholders (to enhance political feasibility) may
be less problematic than previously thought. We ﬁnd that desirable distri-
butional outcomes at the industry level can be achieved at relatively low
cost in terms of eﬃciency; without substantial added cost to the overall
economy, the government can implement carbon abatement policies that
protect proﬁts and equity values in fossil fuel industries. The key to this
conclusion is that CO2 abatement policies have the potential to generate
rents that are very large in relation to the potential loss of proﬁt. Under a
standard carbon tax policy, these potential rents do not materialize; in-
stead they become revenues collected by the government. In contrast, un-
der a policy involving freely allocated emissions permits, or a policy in
which some (inframarginal) emissions are exempted from a carbon tax,
ﬁrms realize some of the potential rents.9 Because the potential rents are
very large in relation to potential lost proﬁt, the government can protect
ﬁrms’ proﬁts and equity values in fossil fuel industries by enabling ﬁrms
to retain only a very small fraction of the potential rents. Thus, the govern-
ment needs to freely allocate (as opposed to auction) only a small per-
centage of CO2 emissions permits or, similarly, must exempt only a small
fraction of emissions from the base of a carbon tax.10 Each of these gov-
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revenue. Such revenue has an eﬃciency value because it can be used to
ﬁnance cuts in preexisting distortionary taxes. Since these policies give up
little of this potential revenue, they involve only a small sacriﬁce in terms
of eﬃciency. In suggesting that the revenue sacriﬁce is small relative to
potential revenues, our ﬁndings complement those obtained in a paper by
Vollebergh, de Vries, and Koutstaal (1997), who employ a partial equilib-
rium model to compare the potential tax revenues and abatement costs
that could stem from a carbon tax in the European Union.11
Because the potential rents are quite large, it is also possible to devise
policies that, with relatively little loss of eﬃciency, protect not only the
fossil fuel industries, but also certain industries (such as petroleum reﬁning
and electric utilities) that intensively use fossil energy. These industries
would suﬀer signiﬁcant proﬁt losses under a standard carbon tax.
We also ﬁnd that there is a very large diﬀerence between preserving
ﬁrms’ proﬁts and preserving their tax payments. Allowing ﬁrms to enjoy
a dollar-for-dollar oﬀset to their payments of carbon taxes (e.g., through
industry-speciﬁc cuts in corporate tax rates) substantially overcompen-
sates ﬁrms, raising proﬁts and equity values signiﬁcantly relative to the un-
regulated situation. This reﬂects the fact that producers can shift onto con-
sumers most of the burden from a carbon tax. The eﬃciency costs of such
policies are far greater than the costs of policies that do not overcompen-
sate ﬁrms. To maintain ﬁrms’ proﬁts, the government needs to oﬀer tax
relief representing only a small fraction of carbon tax payments.12
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides
a brief description of the numerical general equilibrium model employed
to evaluate the various policy alternatives. Section 2.3 then indicates the
links in the model between the various policy alternatives and ﬁrms’ proﬁts
and equity values. Section 2.4 brieﬂy describes the model’s data and pa-
rameters. Section 2.5 indicates the policies under consideration, and sec-
tion 2.6 conveys and discusses the results from numerical simulations. The
ﬁnal section oﬀers conclusions.
and de Mooij (1994) with one factor of production (labor). Our analysis diﬀers from Farrow’s
in its consideration of imperfectly mobile capital and its attention to the implications of
pollution-abatement policies for ﬁrms’ proﬁts and equity values.
11. Vollebergh, de Vries, and Koutstaal (1997) calculate the tax revenues and abatement
costs that would stem from a carbon tax suﬃcient to reduce CO2 emissions by 13 percent in
the countries of the European Union. Their results indicate that the revenues from this tax
would be many times the policy-generated abatement costs. This suggests that exempting a
small share of inframarginal emissions from the carbon tax (or grandfathering a small share
of the permits under a permits policy) would be suﬃcient to compensate the fossil fuel suppli-
ers involved.
12. Felder and Schleiniger (1999) consider the eﬃciency costs of meeting the constraint
that there be no “monetary transfers” (i.e., no change in overall tax payments) as a result of
a carbon tax policy. Using a numerical general equilibrium model of Switzerland, they meet
this constraint through industry-speciﬁc output subsidies or labor subsidies.
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This section outlines the structure of the intertemporal general equilib-
rium model employed in this study. The model is an intertemporal general
equilibrium model of the U.S. economy with international trade. It gener-
ates paths of equilibrium prices, outputs, and incomes for the U.S. econ-
omy and the rest of the world under speciﬁed policy scenarios. All vari-
ables are calculated at yearly intervals beginning in the benchmark year
2000 and usually extending to the year 2075.
The model combines a fairly realistic treatment of the U.S. tax system
and a detailed representation of energy production and demand. It incor-
porates speciﬁc tax instruments and addresses eﬀects of taxation along a
number of important dimensions. These include ﬁrms’ investment incen-
tives, equity values, and proﬁts;13 and household consumption, saving, and
labor-supply decisions. The speciﬁcation of energy supply incorporates the
nonrenewable nature of crude petroleum and natural gas and the transi-
tions from conventional to synthetic fuels.
U.S. production divides into the 13 industries indicated in table 2.1. The
energy industries consist of (1) coal mining, (2) crude petroleum and natu-
ral gas extraction, (3) petroleum reﬁning, (4) synthetic fuels, (5) electric
utilities, and (6) gas utilities. The model also distinguishes the 17 consumer
goods shown in the table.
2.2.1 Producer Behavior
General Speciﬁcations
In each industry, a nested production structure accounts for substitution
between diﬀerent forms of energy as well as between energy and other
inputs. Each industry produces a distinct output (X), which is a function
of the inputs of labor (L), capital (K), an energy composite (E), a materials
composite (M), and the current level of investment (I):
(1) Xf g L K h E M I K I =− ⋅ [(, ) ,( , ) ] (/ ) . 	
The energy composite is made up of the outputs of the six energy indus-
tries, while the materials composite consists of the outputs of the other in-
dustries:
(2) E E xx xxxx =+ (, ,,,) , 23 4567
(3) MM x x x = ( , ,..., ), 18 1 3
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13. Here the model applies the asset-price approach to investment developed in Sum-
mers (1981).where xi is a composite of domestically produced and foreign made input
i.14 Industry indices correspond to those in table 2.1.
Managers of ﬁrms choose input quantities and investment levels to max-






1. Agriculture and noncoal mining 993.6 6.2
2. Coal mining 50.5 0.3
3. Crude petroleum and natural gas 193.7 1.2
4. Synthetic fuels 0.0 0.0
5. Petroleum reﬁning 324.6 2.0
6. Electric utilities 234.6 1.5
7. Gas utilities 211.5 1.3
8. Construction 1508.8 9.5
9. Metals and machinery 799.1 5.0
10. Motor vehicles 541.2 3.4
11. Miscellaneous manufacturing 3365.2 21.3
12. Services (except housing) 5183.6 32.8









8. Clothing and jewelry
9. Transportation
10. Motor vehicles
11. Services (except ﬁnancial)
12. Financial services
13. Recreation, reading, and
miscellaneous
14. Nondurable, nonfood household
expenditure
15. Gasoline and other fuels
16. Education
17. Health
aBillions of year 2000 dollars.
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14. The functions f,g,a n dh, and the aggregation functions for the composites E, M,a n dxi,
feature a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) and exhibit constant returns to scale. Con-
sumer goods are produced by combining outputs from the 13 industries in ﬁxed proportions.imize the value of the ﬁrm. The investment decision takes account of the
adjustment (or installation) costs represented by 	(I/K) 
 I in equation (1),
where 	 is a convex function of the rate of investment I/K.15
Special Features of the Oil and Gas and Synthetic Fuels Industries
The production structure in the oil and gas industry is somewhat more
complex than in other industries to account for the nonrenewable nature
of oil and gas stocks. The production speciﬁcation is
(4) XZ f g L K h E M I K I =⋅ − ⋅ 	 ( ) [(, ) ,( , ) ] (/ ) ,
where  is a decreasing function of Z, the cumulative extraction of oil and
gas up to the beginning of the current period. This captures the idea that
as Z rises (or, equivalently, as reserves are depleted), it becomes increas-
ingly diﬃcult to extract oil and gas resources, so that greater quantities of
K, L, E,a n dM are required to achieve any given level of extraction (out-
put). Each oil and gas producer perfectly recognizes the impact of its cur-
rent production decisions on future extraction costs.16 Increasing produc-
tion costs ultimately induce oil and gas producers to remove their capital
from this industry.
The model incorporates a synthetic fuel—shale oil—as a backstop re-
source, a perfect substitute for oil and gas.17 The technology for producing
synthetic fuels on a commercial scale is assumed to become known in
2020. Thus, capital formation in the synthetic fuels industry cannot begin
until that year.
All domestic prices in the model are endogenous, except for the domes-
tic price of oil and gas. The path of oil and gas prices follows the assump-
tions of the Stanford University Energy Modeling Forum.18 The supply of
imported oil and gas is taken to be perfectly elastic at the world price. So
long as imports are the marginal source of supply to the domestic econ-
omy, domestic producers of oil and gas receive the world price (adjusted
for tariﬀs or taxes) for their own output. However, rising oil and gas prices
stimulate investment in synthetic fuels. Eventually, synthetic fuel produc-
tion plus domestic oil and gas supply together satisfy all of the domestic
demand. Synthetic fuels then become the marginal source of supply, so
that the cost of synthetic fuel production rather than the world oil price
dictates the domestic price of fuels.19
15. The function 	 represents adjustment costs per unit of investment. This function ex-
presses the notion that installing new capital necessitates a loss of current output because
existing inputs (K, L, E,a n dM) are diverted to install new capital.
16. We assume representative oil and gas ﬁrms: initial resource stocks, proﬁt-maximizing
extraction levels, and resource-stock eﬀects are identical across producers.
17. Thus, inputs 3 (oil and gas) and 4 (synthetic fuels) enter additively in the energy aggre-
gation function shown in equation (2).
18. The world price is $19 per barrel in 2000 and rises in real terms by $5.00 per decade.
See Gaskins and Weyant (1996).
19. For details, see Goulder (1994, 1995a).
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Consumption, labor supply, and saving result from the decisions of a
representative household maximizing its intertemporal utility, deﬁned on
leisure and overall consumption in each period. The utility function is ho-
mothetic, and leisure and consumption are weakly separable (see the ap-
pendixes). The household faces an intertemporal budget constraint requir-
ing that the present value of consumption not exceed potential total wealth
(nonhuman wealth plus the present value of labor and transfer income).
In each period, overall consumption of goods and services is allocated
across the 17 speciﬁc categories of consumption goods or services shown
in table 2.1. Each of the 17 consumption goods or services is a composite
of a domestically and foreign-produced consumption good (or service) of
that type. Households substitute between domestic and foreign goods to
minimize the cost of obtaining a given composite.
2.2.3 The Government Sector
The government collects taxes, distributes transfers, and purchases
goods and services (outputs of the 13 industries). The tax instruments in-
clude energy taxes, output taxes, the corporate income tax, property taxes,
sales taxes, and taxes on individual labor and capital income. In the bench-
mark year, 2000, the government deﬁcit amounts to approximately 2 per-
cent of GDP. In the reference case (or status quo) simulation, the real
deﬁcit grows at the steady-state growth rate given by the growth of poten-
tial labor services. In the policy-change cases, we require that real govern-
ment spending and the real deﬁcit follow the same paths as in the reference
case. To make the policy changes revenue-neutral, we accompany the tax-
rate increases that deﬁne the various policies with reductions in other
taxes, either on a lump-sum basis (increased exogenous transfers) or
through reductions in marginal tax rates.
2.2.4 Foreign Trade
Except for oil and gas imports, imported intermediate and consumer
goods are imperfect substitutes for their domestic counterparts.20 Import
prices are exogenous in foreign currency, but the domestic-currency price
changes with variations in the exchange rate. Export demands are modeled
as functions of the foreign price of U.S. exports and the level of foreign
income (in foreign currency). The exchange rate adjusts to balance trade
in every period.
2.2.5 Equilibrium and Growth
The solution of the model is a general equilibrium in which supplies and
demands balance in all markets at each period of time. The requirements
20. Thus, we adopt the assumption of Armington (1969).
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and for all produced goods, that ﬁrms’ demands for loanable funds match
the aggregate supply by households, and that the government’s tax reve-
nues equal its spending less the current deﬁcit. These conditions are met
through adjustments in output prices, in the market interest rate, and in
lump-sum taxes or marginal tax rates.21
Economic growth reﬂects the growth of capital stocks and of potential
labor resources. The growth of capital stocks stems from endogenous sav-
ing and investment behavior. Potential labor resources are speciﬁed as in-
creasing at an exogenous rate.
2.3 Relationships between Carbon Abatement Policies,
Proﬁts, and Equity Values
An important component of this study is the impact of CO2 abatement
policies on the proﬁtability of ﬁrms that supply fossil fuels. The ﬁrst part
of this section describes in fairly general terms the model’s treatment of
ﬁrms’ proﬁts and equity values, while the second part focuses on how
abatement policies aﬀect these elements. In all of this section, we concen-
trate on the fossil fuel industries: coal, and oil and gas.
2.3.1 Proﬁts, Dividends, and Equity Values
Let  denote the (ﬁxed) ratio of carbon emissions to units of fuel (out-
put) in the industry in question, and let c denote the carbon tax rate per
unit of emissions. Then the carbon tax c requires a payment of c per
unit of output X. The equity value of the ﬁrm can be expressed in terms
of dividends and new share issues, which in turn depend on proﬁts in each
period. The ﬁrm’s proﬁts during a given period are given by
(5)   

=− − − + −
−− + + +




p X w L EMCOST
iDEBT TPROP LS DEPL DEPR
where a is the corporate tax rate (or tax rate on proﬁts), p is the output
price, w is the wage rate net of indirect labor taxes, L is rate of the indirect
tax on labor, EMCOST is the cost to the ﬁrm of energy and materials
inputs, i is the gross-of-tax interest rate paid by the ﬁrm, DEBT is the
ﬁrm’s current debt, TPROP is property tax payments, LS is a lump-sum
receipt (if applicable) by the ﬁrm, DEPL is the current gross depletion
allowance, and DEPR is the current gross depreciation allowance. TPROP
equals ppK,s1Ks, where p is the property tax rate, pK is the purchase price
of a unit of new capital, and s is the time period. Current depletion allow-
21. Since agents are forward-looking, equilibrium in each period depends not only on
current prices and taxes but on future magnitudes as well.
54 A. Lans Bovenberg and Lawrence H. Goulderances, DEPL, are a constant fraction  of the value of current extraction:
DEPL  pX. Current depreciation allowances, DEPR, can be expressed
as TK T, where K T is the depreciable capital stock basis and T is the depre-
ciation rate applied for tax purposes.22
The ﬁrm’s sources and uses of revenues are linked through the cash-
ﬂow identity
(6)  ++= + BN VN DIV IEXP.
The left-hand side represents the ﬁrm’s sources of revenues: proﬁts, new
debt issue (BN), and new share issues (VN). The uses of revenues on the
right-hand side are investment expenditure (IEXP) and dividend payments
(DIV). Negative share issues are equivalent to share repurchases and rep-
resent a use rather than a source of revenue.
Firms pay dividends equal to a constant fraction, a, of proﬁts gross of
capital gains on the existing capital stock and net of economic deprecia-
tion. They also maintain debt equal to a constant fraction, b, of the value
of the existing capital stock. Thus,
(7) DIV a p p K p K ss K s k s s K s s =+− − − [( ) ] , ,, ,  1
(8) BN DEBT DEBT b p K p K ss s K s s K s s ≡− = − ++ − 11 1 () . ,,
Investment expenditure is expressed by
(9) IEXP p I sK K s s =− () , , 1 
where K is the investment tax credit rate. Of the elements in equation (6),
new share issues, VN, are the residual, making up the diﬀerence between
BN and DIV  IEXP.23
Arbitrage possibilities compel the ﬁrm to oﬀer its stockholders a rate of
return comparable to the rate of interest on alternative assets:
(10) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) . 11 1 1 −+ − − − = − +   es v s s s b s s DIV V V VN iV
The parameters e, v,a n db are the personal tax rates on dividend income
(equity), capital gains, and interest income (bonds), respectively. The re-
turn to stockholders consists of the current after-tax dividend plus the
after-tax capital gain (accrued or realized) on the equity value (V) of the
ﬁrm net of the value of new share issues. This return must be comparable
to the after-tax return from an investment of the same value at the market
rate of interest, i.
Recursively applying equation (10) subject to the usual transversality
22. For convenience, we assume that the accelerated depreciation schedule can be approxi-
mated by a schedule involving a constant rate of exponential tax depreciation.
23. This treatment is consistent with the “old view” of dividend behavior. For an examina-
tion of this and alternative speciﬁcations, see Poterba and Summers (1985).
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pression for the equity value of the ﬁrm:










































Equation (11) indicates that the equity value of the ﬁrm is the discounted
sum of after-tax dividends net of new share issues.
2.3.2 Abatement Policies and Equity Values
A Standard Carbon Tax
Abatement policies aﬀect equity values by altering ﬁrms’ proﬁts and the
stream of dividends paid by ﬁrms. A carbon tax, in particular, will tend to
lower the proﬁts of ﬁrms in the industries on which the tax is imposed.
Figure 2.1 heuristically indicates the carbon tax’s implications for the
coal industry.24
The line labeled S0 in the ﬁgure is the supply curve for coal in the ab-
sence of a tax. This diagram accounts for the quasi-ﬁxed nature of capital
resulting from capital-adjustment costs. The supply curve S0 should be
regarded as an average of an inﬁnite number of supply curves, beginning
with the curve depicting the marginal cost of changes in supply in the ﬁrst
instant and culminating with the marginal cost of changing supply over
the very long term, when all factors are mobile. This curve therefore indi-
cates the average of the discounted marginal costs of expanding produc-
tion, given the size of the initial capital stock. We draw the supply curve
as upward sloping, in keeping with the fact that in all time frames except
the very long run capital is not fully mobile and production exhibits de-
creasing returns in the variable factors—labor and intermediate inputs.25
The supply curve represents the marginal costs associated with incre-
ments in the use of variable factors to increase supply. Capital is the ﬁxed
factor underlying the upward-sloping supply curve. The return to this fac-
tor is the producer surplus in the diagram. With an upward-sloping supply
curve, this producer surplus is positive. The existence of producer surplus
does not necessarily imply supernormal proﬁts. Indeed, in an initial long-
24. Pezzey and Park (1998, ﬁg. 1) oﬀer a somewhat similar analysis for policies involving
tradable emissions permits.
25. In the long run, in contrast, capital is fully mobile, production exhibits constant returns
to scale, and the supply curve is inﬁnitely elastic.
56 A. Lans Bovenberg and Lawrence H. Goulderrun equilibrium, the producer surplus is just large enough to yield a nor-
mal return on the capital stock. To illustrate, at the initial equilibrium with
a market price p0 and aggregate quantity supplied Q0, the producer surplus
amounts to the triangular area bhd. On a balanced-growth path, this pro-
ducer surplus yields a normal (market) return on the initial capital stock
so that the value of the initial capital stock equals the price of investment
(and thus Tobin’s q is unity).
Now consider the impact of an unanticipated carbon (coal) tax. The
introduction of this tax shifts the supply curve upward to S1. As a direct
consequence, the output price paid by coal consumers increases from p0
to pD1. However, since supply is not inﬁnitely elastic, the suppliers of coal
are not able to shift the entire burden of the tax onto demanders. Indeed,
the producer price of coal declines to pS1. This causes producer surplus to
shrink to the area cgd. Since this triangle is smaller than the initial pro-
ducer surplus, the return on the initial capital stock (valued at the price of
investment goods) falls short of the market rate of return. Hence, to satisfy
the arbitrage condition, Tobin’s q falls below unity and the owners of the
capital stock suﬀer a capital loss.
This analysis is complicated by the fact that the carbon tax can ﬁnance
reductions in other taxes, which may imply reductions in costs to ﬁrms.
This will tend to oﬀset the carbon-tax-induced losses in proﬁts and the
associated reductions in equity values. To the extent that the carbon tax
revenues ﬁnance general (economy-wide) reductions in personal or corpo-
rate income taxes, the reductions in tax rates will be small and thus will
exert only a small impact on costs to the fossil fuel industries. If the reve-
Fig. 2.1 CO2 abatement and proﬁts
Neutralizing Adverse Industry Impacts of CO2 Abatement Policies 57nues are recycled through tax cuts targeted for the fossil fuel industries,
however, the changes in marginal rates can be signiﬁcant and the beneﬁcial
oﬀsetting impact on proﬁts and equity values may be more pronounced.
Eﬀects of Rent-Generating Policies
In ﬁgure 2.1, the shaded rectangle R (with area aegc) represents the
ﬁrms’ payments of the carbon tax. If the government forgoes some of the
carbon tax revenue, and allows producers to retain this potential revenue
as a rent, the impact on proﬁts, dividends, and equity values can be funda-
mentally diﬀerent. Consider, for example, the case in which the govern-
ment restricts CO2 emissions through a system of carbon permits. Since
such emissions are proportional to coal combustion, the government can
accomplish a given percentage reduction in emissions from coal by re-
stricting coal output by that same percentage through the sale of a limited
number of coal-supply permits. For comparability, suppose that the num-
ber of permits restricts supply to the level Q1 in the ﬁgure. If the permits
are auctioned competitively, then the government (ideally) collects the rev-
enue R from sale of the permits and the eﬀects on ﬁrms are the same as
underthecarbontax.Incontrast,ifthepermitsaregivenoutfree(orgrand-
fathered), then the area R represents a rent to ﬁrms. The government-
mandated restrictionin output causesprices to rise,but there isno increase
in costs of production (indeed, marginal production costs are lower).
As suggested by ﬁgure 2.1, this rent can be quite large and, indeed, can
imply substantial increases in proﬁts and equity values to the regulated
industries. In the ﬁgure, the postregulation proﬁts enjoyed by the ﬁrm are
given by the sum of areas R and cgd. Here postregulation proﬁts are many
times higher than the proﬁt prior to regulation (bhd). Owners of industry-
speciﬁc capital enjoy a capital gain as Tobin’s q jumps above unity. Intu-
itively, by restricting output, government policy allows producers as a
group to exploit their market power and reap part of the original con-
sumer surplus.
Using comparable diagrams, it is straightforward to verify that the mag-
nitude of the proﬁt increase under a system of grandfathered emissions
permits depends on
1. The extent of abatement (or number of permits issued relative to
“business-as-usual” emissions). The regulation-induced increase in proﬁt
is represented by the diﬀerence between the areas of the rectangle aefb and
the triangle fhg. For incremental restrictions in supply, the former will be
larger than the latter (if demand is less than inﬁnitely elastic). Thus, pro-
ducers must gain. However, this is not necessarily the case as the magni-
tude of the required reduction in supply gets larger. If the demand curve
has a “choke price” (a price above which demand is strictly 0), then the
potential rent will shrink to 0 as the extent of abatement approaches 100
percent.
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proﬁts from restrictions on output is larger, the higher the elasticity of
supply. In this case, most of the burden associated with reductions in out-
put is borne by consumers, and a large share of the rents rectangle R repre-
sents an increase in producer surplus—that is, most of R will lie above p0.
In contrast, if supply is inelastic (as in the case where adjustment costs are
substantial), very little of the rents rectangle R represents an increase in
producer surplus because much of it extends below the initial output price
p0. In this case, restrictions in output do not enable producers to expropri-
ate much of the consumer surplus. Thus, the rectangle aefb will be smaller
than the triangle fhg, and proﬁts will fall.
A small income share of the ﬁxed factor (i.e., capital in our model) con-
tributes to a large supply elasticity. A large supply elasticity (or ﬂat supply
curve) implies that the producer surplus bhd (i.e., the income to the ﬁxed
factor) is small while most of the area R will lie above p0. Hence the addi-
tional proﬁts will be large compared to the initial producer surplus.
3. The elasticity of demand. If demand is highly elastic, the policy-
induced reduction in output gives ﬁrms relatively little market power—
only a small part of R will lie above p0. In contrast, if demand is inelastic,
the abatement policy enables ﬁrms to exercise substantial market power.
In this case, much of R will lie above p0, and ﬁrms will be able to expropri-
ate a considerable amount of the consumer surplus. The aggregate elas-
ticity of demand for a given fossil fuel will reﬂect the elasticities of substi-
tution inherent in the production functions of domestic users of coal. In
addition, the response of demand will reﬂect the extent to which the gov-
ernment insulates domestic fossil fuel producers from foreign competition.
In particular, the elasticity of demand will be smaller, and the potential to
enjoy large rents larger, to the extent that the government accompanies
taxes on domestic production with levies on imports on fossil fuels and
subsidies to exports of such fuels. Carbon taxes or auctioned emissions
permits applicable to imported fuels cause the imported fuel prices to rise
in tandem with the prices of domestic fuels, thus preventing domestic con-
sumers from shifting demand to imported fuels. Export subsidies ensure
that the prices of exported fuels do not rise relative to foreign fuel prices,
and thus they help to sustain foreign demand for domestically produced
fuels.
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where the factors 1  v and 1  a address the fact that the rents are
subject to the personal and corporate income taxes, respectively. Here Q1,t
represents gross output (under the policy change) at time t.
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that would enable ﬁrms to capture much of R. Firms could capture some
of R under a carbon tax policy in which inframarginal emissions (emis-
sions below some trigger level) are exempt from the tax, while all emissions
beyond that level face the tax.26
In sum, the impact on ﬁrms’ proﬁts and equity values can be fundamen-
tally diﬀerent, depending on how much of the area R is retained by ﬁrms
rather than collected by the government. It also depends on how much of
the area R lies above the initial equilibrium price. This, in turn, will depend
on the extent of abatement and on elasticities of supply and demand. We
return to these issues in the discussion of policy results in section 2.6.
2.4 Data and Parameters
Data documentation is in Cruz and Goulder (1992), which is available
on request. Industry input and output ﬂows (used to establish share pa-
rameters for production functions) were obtained from the 1988 input-out-
put table from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department
of Commerce. This table is also the source for consumption, investment,
government spending, import, and export values by industry. Data on in-
dustry capital stocks derive from Bureau of Economic Analysis (1994).
Employment by industry was obtained from the October 1990 Survey of
Current Business. To form the benchmark data set, these data are pro-
jected to the year 2000, based on the average growth of real GDP from
the relevant historical period to 1998. Data on the carbon content of fossil
fuels were obtained from the 1998 U.S. Department of Energy Annual En-
ergy Outlook.
Elasticities of substitution determine the industry and household price
elasticities of demand. We derive the production function elasticities by
transforming parameters of translog production functions estimated by
Dale Jorgenson and Peter Wilcoxen (personal communication). The cap-
ital-adjustment cost parameters are based on Summers (1981).
Other important parameters apply to the household side of the model.
The elasticity of substitution in consumption between goods and leisure, ,
is set to yield a compensated elasticity of labor supply of 0.4.27 The inter-
temporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, , equals 0.5.28 The in-
tensity parameter c is set to generate a ratio of labor time to the total time
endowment equal to 0.44. These parameters imply a value of 0.19 for the
interest elasticity of savings between the current period and the next.
26. Farrow (1999) describes and evaluates a policy of this sort. See also Pezzey (1992).
27. This lies midway in the range of estimates displayed in the recent survey by Russek
(1996).
28. This value falls between the lower estimates from time-series analyses (e.g., Hall 1988)
and the higher ones from cross-sectional studies (e.g., Lawrance 1991).
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In nearly all simulations, the tool for abatement is the carbon tax (al-
thoughwealsoconsiderCO2quotasortradablepermits,asdiscussedlater).
All policies are unanticipated and phased in smoothly (with equal incre-
ments to the carbon tax) over a 3-year period beginning in the base year,
2000.Thecarbontaxislevied“upstream”;thatis,thetaxisimposedonsup-
pliersoffossilfuels(producersofcoalandofoilandgas).Topreventanad-
verse impact on the international competitive position of fossil-fuel-
producingindustries,exportsoffossilfuelsare exemptfromthecarbontax,
whileimportsofthesefuelsaresubjecttothecarbontax.Nearlyallpropos-
als for a U.S. carbon tax include export and import elements of this type.
The policies diﬀer in two main ways: (1) the way the gross revenues from
the carbon tax are recycled to the private sector, and (2) the extent to which
the policies create and leave rents for the regulated ﬁrms. We normalize the
carbon tax so that discounted carbon emissions are the same across the
policies.29 We do not allow for public debt policy. Hence, all gross revenues
from the carbon tax are immediately returned to the private sector.
2.5.1 Starting Point: Policies without Distributional Adjustments
The ﬁrst set of policies involves broad-based revenue recycling and thus
does not attend to distributional concerns. These policies involve three
alternative ways to recycle the revenues: higher lump-sum transfers to
households, lower personal income tax rates, and lower corporate income
tax rates. We implement these recycling options by using the recycling in-
strument to endogenously balance the government budget.
The other policies involve additional elements to address important dis-
tributional considerations. Thus these policies involve not only environ-
mental neutrality (the reductions in emissions are normalized across poli-
cies) and revenue neutrality (all gross revenues are recycled), but also some
form of distributional neutrality. The attention to distributional neutrality
is motivated by concerns about equity and political feasibility.
2.5.2 Imposing the Requirement of Equity-Value Neutrality
The ﬁrst group of policies to attend to distributional neutrality adds the
constraint that the real30 value of equity of the principally aﬀected indus-
tries must not be changed (i.e., reduced) at the time the abatement policy
29. In the simulations, we have approximated environmental neutrality by scaling the re-
sults of a uniform carbon tax of $25 per ton carbon by discounted emissions reductions. We
ﬁnd that eﬃciency outcomes from the model are close to linear within the small range of
variation in emissions reductions, so that this type of scaling does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the
interpretation of results.
30. To express the equity values in real terms, we adopt the ideal price index that is associ-
ated with the utility function of the representative household.
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value neutrality. The most vulnerable industries are fossil-fuel-supplying
industries (coal, and oil and gas), the petroleum reﬁning industry, and the
electric utilities industry.31 The constraint on the value of equity can be
interpreted as the requirement that industry-speciﬁc production factors
not be hurt by the carbon tax. In the model, labor is perfectly mobile
across industries, while capital is subject to adjustment costs. Since capital
is the only the industry-speciﬁc production factor, the eﬀect on the value
of capital represents the impact of the carbon tax on industry-speciﬁc pro-
duction factors. Unanticipated policies yield instantaneous changes in the
value of industry-speciﬁc wealth, as measured by changes in the equity
values of various industries.
We consider three mechanisms for achieving equity-value neutrality:
(1) industry-speciﬁc cuts in corporate tax rates, (2) lump-sum transfers to
capital employed in particular industries, and (3) inframarginal exemp-
tions to the carbon tax. Our model abstracts from uncertainty and from
heterogeneity across ﬁrms in a given industry. In such a model, a policy
involving emissions permits, in which a certain fraction of the permits is
given out free (rather than auctioned), is equivalent to a carbon tax policy
in which the same fraction of (inframarginal) emissions is exempt from the
carbon tax.32 Thus, the third policy can be interpreted as one in which
the government controls emissions through emissions permits and freely
allocates, or grandfathers, some of these permits. We simulate this policy
by imposing a $25 per ton carbon tax and rebating to the ﬁrm a share of
its tax payment, with the share corresponding to the percentage of emis-
sions that are exempt from the tax. The rebate is lump-sum from the ﬁrm’s
point of view. Under this simulation, output and emissions from the coal
and the oil and gas industries rise through time. Hence, this corresponds to
an emissions permit policy in which the number of permits in circulation
increases through time.
In our simulations, the policies with inframarginal exemptions have the
potential to produce dramatic impacts on proﬁts and equity values. For
this reason, we perform additional policy experiments involving inframar-
ginal exemptions of various magnitudes. In these experiments, we do not
aim to achieve equity-value neutrality, but instead focus on how proﬁts,
equity values, and other important variables are aﬀected by the magnitude
of the exemptions. The policies introduced under this heading are an emis-
sions permit system in which 100 percent of the permits are grandfathered,
31. Thus we focus on four of the six energy industries identiﬁed in the model. We give less
attention to the natural gas-delivery industry, which experiences considerably smaller im-
pacts from the abatement policies, and the synthetic fuels industry, which does not emerge
signiﬁcantly until 2025.
32. They are equivalent under appropriate scaling of the two policies: The limit on emis-
sions under the permits program must be the same as the level of emissions that occurs under
the carbon tax.
62 A. Lans Bovenberg and Lawrence H. Goulderand a carbon tax with inframarginal exemptions equal to 50 or 90 percent
of ﬁrst-period emissions under the unregulated status quo. The rents gen-
erated by each of these policies face the same taxes as other producer
income and thus are subject to the corporate income tax.
These policies involve three instruments to achieve three targets. The
carbon tax rate assures environmental neutrality (the same emissions re-
ductions), the adjustment to the personal income tax rate yields revenue
neutrality (all additional revenues from the carbon tax must be recycled),
and the industry-speciﬁc corporate income tax cuts, lump-sum payments,
or inframarginal exemptions bring about equity-value neutrality.
2.5.3 Imposing the Requirement of Tax-Payment Neutrality
In the political arena, a popular indicator of distributional neutrality is
the tax payment of a particular industry.33 According to this alternative
notion of distributional neutrality, a given industry’s overall tax payments
from carbon taxes, corporate taxes, property taxes, and indirect labor taxes
should remain constant. We term this tax-payment neutrality. As instru-
ments for this type of neutrality we consider industry-speciﬁc corporate
tax cuts and explicit lump-sum transfers to sector-speciﬁc capital. As with
the simulations involving equity-value neutrality, the tax-payment neutral-
ity simulations involve policy packages in which three instruments achieve
three targets.
2.6 Simulation Results
2.6.1 Policies without Distributional Adjustments
Policy 1: Lump-Sum Recycling
We begin by examining the eﬀects of the $25 per ton carbon tax with
lump-sum recycling. Results are displayed in column (1) of table 2.2. The
table shows the impacts on prices, output, and after-tax proﬁts for years
2002 (2 years after implementation) and 2025.
The coal industry experiences the largest impact on prices and output.
In this industry, prices rise by approximately 54 percent by the time the
policy is fully implemented (year 2002) and the price increase is sustained
at slightly above that level. The price increase implies a reduction in output
of about 24 percent in the long run. The other major impacts on prices
and output are in the oil and gas, petroleum reﬁning, and electric utilities
industries. Although the carbon tax is imposed on the oil and gas indus-
try, the price increase is considerably smaller than in the coal industry,
reﬂecting the lower carbon content (per dollar of fuel) of oil and gas as
33. Indeed, in several countries, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, additional environ-
mental taxes raised from energy-intensive industries are earmarked for technology subsidies
to this sector.
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Lump- PIT CIT Speciﬁc Lump- Grandfathering
Sum Rate Rate CIT Sum of Emissions
Transfer Reduction Reduction Rate Cut Payment Permitsa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





Agriculture and 0.7 0.2 1.4 0.1 0.1 0.1
noncoal mining
Coal mining 28.4 27.8 27.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.043)
Oil and gas 4.8 5.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.150)
Petroleum reﬁning 5.2 4.5 3.3 0.0 0.0 4.5
Electric utilities 6.3 5.4 4.4 0.0 0.0 5.4
Natural gas utilities 1.4 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.4
Construction 0.3 1.5 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.5
Metals and 1.2 0.4 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.4
machinery
Motor vehicles 0.6 0.2 1.6 0.2 0.2 0.2
Miscellaneous 0.8 0.1 1.4 0.2 0.1 0.1
manufacturing
Services (except 0.8 0.2 1.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
housing)
Housing services 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.4
Total 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.0
Eﬃciency cost
Absolute (billions of 817 471 374 345 482 506
year 2000 dollars)
Per ton of CO2 102.6 60.0 47.7 46.9 61.4 64.4
reduction
Per dollar of carbon .73 .42 .34 .30 .43 .50
tax revenue
compared with coal. There are signiﬁcant increases in prices and reduc-
tions in output in the petroleum reﬁning and electric utilities industries as
well, in keeping with the signiﬁcant use of fossil fuels in these industries.
The reductions in output are accompanied by reductions in annual after-
tax proﬁts. Associated with these output reductions is a reduction in CO2
emissions of approximately 18 percent.34
34. This is the reduction in emissions associated with domestic consumption of fossil fuels.
It accounts for the carbon content of imported fossil fuels, and excludes the carbon content
of exported fossil fuels. These ﬁgures do not adjust for changes in the carbon content of
imported or exported reﬁned products. The percentage change in emissions is the percentage
change between the reference case and policy-change case in the present value of emissions,Table 2.3 (continued)
Tax-Payment Neutrality
Inframarginal Exemptions
Imposed via Exempt 100% of
Actual Emissions
(100% Exempt Exempt Industry- Industry-
Grandfathering 50% of 90% of Speciﬁc Speciﬁc
of Emissions BAU BAU CIT Lump-Sum
Permits) Emissions Emissions Rate Cut Payment
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11)





Agriculture and 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4
noncoal mining
Coal mining 1,005.4 709.1 1,284.0 1,283.3 4,283.7
Oil and gas 29.2 22.3 43.1 43.2 117.2
Petroleum reﬁning 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.8 12.1
Electric utilities 5.7 5.6 5.7 5.8 12.9
Natural gas utilities 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.1
Construction 1.0 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.2
Metals and 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.9
machinery
Motor vehicles 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4
Miscellaneous 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.6
manufacturing
Services (except 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5
housing)
Housing services 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1
Total 1.1 0.7 1.3 1.2 4.5
Eﬃciency cost
Absolute (billions of 751 549 611 355 713
year 2000 dollars)
Per ton of CO2 95.1 69.7 77.4 61.1 89.9
reduction
Per dollar of carbon — .79 1.64 .32 .64
tax revenue
aNumbers in parentheses are proportion of emssions permits required to achieve equity-value neutrality.
The reductions in after-tax proﬁts are associated with reductions in eq-
uity values. As shown in table 2.3, the largest equity-value impacts are in
the coal industry, where such values fall by approximately 28 percent. The
reductions in equity values in the oil and gas, petroleum reﬁning, and elec-
tric utilities industries are also substantial, in the range of 4.8 to 6.3 per-
cent. As indicated in the table, the impacts on equity values of other indus-
tries are relatively small.
where the emissions stream is discounted using the after-tax interest rate. If marginal envi-
ronmental damages from emissions are constant, the percentage changes in discounted emis-
sions will be equivalent to percentage changes in damages.
Neutralizing Adverse Industry Impacts of CO2 Abatement Policies 67Table 2.3 also indicates eﬃciency impacts. We employ the equivalent
variation to measure these impacts. This is a gross measure because our
model does not account for the beneﬁts associated with the environmental
improvement from reduced emissions. As indicated in the table, the policy
impliesagrosseﬃciencylossofapproximately$103pertonofemissionsre-
duced,or $0.73 per dollar of discounted gross revenue from the carbon tax.
Policy 2: Personal Income Tax Recycling
Policy 2 recycles the revenues through personal income tax (PIT) cuts
rather than via lump-sum payments. As shown in column (2) of table 2.2,
such recycling does not alter the impacts of the carbon tax on prices and
output very much. Furthermore, such recycling only slightly attenuates the
impacts on proﬁts and equity values in the most aﬀected industries. How-
ever, as indicated in table 2.3, this form of recycling reduces the economy-
wide eﬃciency costs by over 40 percent. The equivalent variation is ap-
proximately $60 per ton of emissions reduced, and $0.42 per dollar of
discounted carbon tax revenues. The reason for the smaller eﬃciency
losses with PIT recycling is that, by lowering the marginal rates of the PIT,
this recycling helps lower the distortionary costs of the PIT. This eﬃciency
consequence has been termed the revenue-recycling eﬀect. Despite the
lower distortionary taxes, the carbon tax package still imposes gross eﬃ-
ciency costs because it tends to raise output prices and thereby reduce real
returns to labor and capital. This tax-interaction eﬀect tends to dominate
the revenue-recycling eﬀect. Hence the carbon tax still involves an overall
economic cost (abstracting from the environmental beneﬁts), even when
the revenues are devoted to cuts in the PIT.35
Policy 3: Corporate Income Tax Recycling
The carbon tax revenue can be used instead to reduce the corporate in-
come tax (CIT). This type of recycling further reduces the gross eﬃciency
costs of emission reductions to 34 percent of discounted carbon tax rev-
enues. Thus, CIT recycling appears to be more eﬃcient than PIT recycling.
This indicates that in the model the CIT is more distortionary than the
PIT in the initial equilibrium. Although there is considerable disagreement
as to the distortionary impacts of the CIT, these results are consistent with
the prevailing results from other applied general equilibrium analyses.36 In
35. This exempliﬁes the now-familiar result that, abstracting from the value of the environ-
mental improvement they generate, green taxes tend to be more costly than the ordinary
taxes they replace. Although this is the central result, the opposite outcome can arise when
the preexisting tax system is suboptimal along nonenvironmental dimensions (e.g., involves
overtaxation of capital relative to labor) and the introduction of the environmental reform
helps alleviate the nonenvironmental ineﬃciency. For analysis and discussion of this issue
see Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), Parry (1995), Goulder (1995b), Bovenberg and Goulder
(1997, 2000), and Parry and Bento (2000).
36. See, for example, Jorgenson and Yun (1991), and Goulder and Thalmann (1993).
68 A. Lans Bovenberg and Lawrence H. Goulderthe U.S. economy, taxes on capital investment such as the CIT appear to
be more distortionary than labor income taxes or the PIT (a tax on both
capital and labor income).
A cut in the CIT rate beneﬁts the owners of capital because it reduces
the tax burden on earnings from the installed capital stock. As a result,
compared to the cases with lump-sum recycling or PIT recycling, in the
most aﬀected industries (coal, oil and gas, petroleum reﬁning, and electric
utilities), ﬁrms’ equity values fall less. Indeed, the value of equity in the
oil and gas sector is almost unaﬀected by this policy package. While CIT
recycling signiﬁcantly changes the impact on equity values, it makes rela-
tively little diﬀerence to output patterns. This indicates that changes in
industry output are an unreliable measure of the impact of environmental
policy on the real earnings of industry-speciﬁc production factors.
2.6.2 Policies Achieving Equity-Value Neutrality
We now consider policies that introduce an additional instrument to
alter the distributional impacts. We start with results from policies that
impose the requirement of equity-value neutrality.
Policy 4: Industry-Speciﬁc Cuts in the Corporate Income Tax
Policy 4 achieves equity-value neutrality through industry-speciﬁc ad-
justments to CIT rates (with the remainder of the revenues recycled via
cuts in the PIT). This appears to be an eﬃcient way to attain such neutral-
ity. In fact, as indicated in table 2.3, the gross eﬃciency losses are smaller
than in the case where this constraint is not imposed (policy 2), suggesting
that there is no trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and distributional neutrality
in this case. Twofactors help explain this result. First, inour model the CIT
is more distortionary than the PIT, as indicated by the diﬀerence in eﬃ-
ciency costs of policies 2 and 3. Under policy 4, the eﬃciency beneﬁt from
cutting the CIT rate is oﬀset by the need to ﬁnance these cuts through the
PIT—thatis,thePITcannotbeloweredasmuchunderthispolicyasunder
policy 2, which involves no CIT cuts. Since the CIT is more distortionary
than the PIT, there is an overall eﬃciency beneﬁt from this tax swap.
A second reason for the relatively low eﬃciency cost relates to tax dis-
tortions in the fossil fuel industries. The carbon tax signiﬁcantly raises
the overall taxation of energy industries relative to other industries. On
nonenvironmental grounds, these industries are overtaxed relative to other
industries. Targeted CIT cuts undo some of the nonenvironmental distor-
tions attributable to the carbon tax. We have veriﬁed this eﬀe c tb yp e r -
forming an additional simulation experiment that (like policy 3) recycles
some carbon tax revenues through reductions in the overall CIT rate, but
also (like policy 4) recycles suﬃcient revenues in the form of additional
CIT cuts for the energy industries to preserve equity values in those indus-
tries. This policy involves an eﬃciency cost of $40.9 per ton, signiﬁcantly
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tween this policy and policy 3 is that this policy includes the additional
targeted CIT cuts. Thus there is a (gross) eﬃciency beneﬁt from reducing
the “excess” taxation of energy industries under the carbon tax.37 This is
a second reason why policy 4’s eﬃciency cost is lower than that of policy 2.
Policy 5: Industry-Speciﬁc Lump-Sum Transfers
Policy 5 produces equity-value neutrality through industry-speciﬁc
lump-sum transfers. This appears to be an inexpensive way to ensure dis-
tributional neutrality: Relatively small lump-sum transfers ensure that the
real value of equity is not aﬀected by the carbon tax. These small transfers
absorb relatively little revenue, allowing PIT rates to be cut almost as much
as under policy 2. The cost of emissions abatement (relative to policy 2) is
raised by only a small amount, from $60.0 to $61.4 per ton.
Policy 6: Grandfathered Emissions Permits
As discussed in section 2.2, emissions quotas or permits, by forcing
ﬁrms to restrict output, can create rents for the regulated industries. At
the same time, there are costs to these industries connected with the reduc-
tion in output and the associated need to remove capital or retire capital
prematurely.38 The question arises whether the policy-induced rents might
be suﬃcient to compensate ﬁrms for the other costs associated with
abatement.39
We consider this issue with policy 6. Here we introduce a carbon tax,
but grant ﬁrms exemptions to this tax for a certain percentage of their
actual emissions. It deserves emphasis that the value of the exemption,
although tied to actual emissions in the industry (in the aggregate), is exog-
enous from the ﬁrm’s point of view. As discussed in section 2.5, this experi-
ment can also be interpreted as a policy in which the government intro-
duces a tradable permits program, but grandfathers a percentage of the
permits. The special case (considered later) in which the ﬁrm enjoys a 100
percent (inframarginal) exemption from the carbon tax corresponds to the
case of fully grandfathered emissions permits.40
37. We are grateful to Ruud de Mooij for suggesting this diagnostic experiment.
38. There are other transition costs, such as the unemployment costs that may result from
reduced output. These are not captured in our analysis.
39. This policy imposes equity-value neutrality only for the coal and oil and gas industries,
since the carbon tax (and its exemptions) or emissions permits apply only to these industries.
The government would need to invoke additional instruments to achieve equity-value neu-
trality in other industries.
40. Three modeling assumptions underlying this correspondence should be noted. First,
the equivalence between a carbon tax policy and a carbon emissions-permits policy would
not hold in a more general model in which regulators faced uncertainty. In the presence of
uncertainty, taxes and permits policies intended to lead to a given level of emissions will
generally yield diﬀerent aggregate emissions ex post. Second, we assume that a cost-eﬀective
allocation of emissions responsibilities is achieved under the permits policy. This implicitly
assumes that any diﬀerences in abatement costs (associated with heterogeneity in ﬁrms’ pro-
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need to be grandfathered in order to achieve equity-value neutrality. Only
15 percent need to be grandfathered in the oil and gas industry, and an
even smaller percentage—4.3 percent—must be grandfathered in the coal
industry! As a result, the goal of distributional neutrality can be achieved
at a small cost in terms of eﬃciency. Earlier research has made clear that
there is a trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and political feasibility associated
with the implementation of an emissions permit program: Eﬃciency re-
quires the auctioning of permits (no grandfathering), whereas political fea-
sibility calls for grandfathering. These results indicate that the trade-oﬀ
may be relatively benign; it only takes a small amount of grandfathering,
and a small sacriﬁce in eﬃciency, to preserve equity values in the industries
that otherwise would suﬀer most from CO2 abatement regulations.41
Why does a small amount of grandfathering go a long way? As sug-
gested by the discussion in section 2.3, the gain oﬀered to regulated ﬁrms
by exemptions to a carbon tax or by the free allocation of emissions per-
mits is enhanced to the extent that elasticities of supply are high and elas-
ticities of demand are low. In this model, the elasticity of supply is deter-
mined by the share of cash ﬂow (payments to owners of the quasi-ﬁxed
factor, capital) in overall production cost, along with the speciﬁcation of
adjustment costs. We ﬁnd that for the coal and oil and gas industries, cash
ﬂow in the unregulated situation is quite small relative to production cost,
which contributes to a higher supply elasticity. In addition, although ad-
justment costs restrict the supply elasticity in the short run, under our
central values for parameters the average elasticity (taking into account
the medium and long runs) is fairly high. Indeed, the long-run elasticity
in the coal industry is inﬁnite because of the assumption of constant re-
turns to scale.42 These conditions imply that most of the cost from abate-
ment policies is shifted onto demand.
duction methods) are ironed out through trades of permits. Third, our model does not distin-
guish between new and old ﬁrms (although it does distinguish between installed and newly
acquired capital). The model’s treatment of grandfathering is most consistent with a situation
in which only established ﬁrms enjoy the freely oﬀered emissions permits, where these per-
mits are linked to the (exogenous) initial (or old) capital stock.
41. Table 2.3 reveals that it is more costly to achieve equity-value neutrality through partial
grandfathering of emissions permits (policy 6) than through lump-sum payments to ﬁrms
(policy 5). The diﬀerence can be attributed to diﬀerences in the treatment of importers of
fossil fuels under the two policies. Both policies can be interpreted as a carbon tax plus an
inframarginal lump-sum rebate. Under policy 5, the rebate or lump-sum payment is oﬀered
only to domestic fossil fuel producers. In contrast, under policy 6, the rebate (via grandfa-
thering) is oﬀered both to domestic fossil fuel producers and to importers of fossil fuels.
Under policy 6, the government is somewhat more generous and forgoes more tax revenue;
hence the added eﬃciency cost. Another diﬀerence between the policies is that the petroleum
reﬁning and electric utilities industries receive direct compensation under policy 5, but enjoy
no protection under policy 6. This would tend to raise the costs of policy 5 relative to policy
6. However, this cost impact is more than oﬀset by the diﬀerences just described in the treat-
ment of importers.
42. In the oil and gas industry, the presence of a ﬁxed factor implies decreasing returns
even in the long run.
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bon tax policy (policy 2) on gross and net output prices in diﬀerent years.
In the coal industry, the net-of-tax coal price falls a bit (relative to the
reference-case price) in the short run, but the carbon tax is fully shifted in
the long run. Even in the short run, over 90 percent of the tax is shifted
onto consumers of coal. In the oil and gas industry, the tax is entirely
forward-shifted in all years, reﬂecting the fact that the United States is
regarded as a price-taker with respect to oil and gas.43
In terms of the analysis of section 2.3, the ability to shift forward the
costs of regulation means that most of the R rectangle lies above the initial
price. When the initial producer surplus or cash ﬂow is small in relation
to production cost, owners of the quasi-ﬁxed factor (capital) can be fully
compensated for the costs of regulation if they are given just a small piece
of the R rectangle through grandfathering.
This is conﬁrmed in table 2.5. The table shows the dynamic equivalent
of the R rectangle under policy 2 (carbon tax with recycling through per-
sonal income tax cuts) and policy 6. To enhance comparisons between
policies 2 and 6, we will interpret each policy as involving emissions per-
mits; policy 2 is the case of emissions permits with no grandfathering,
while policy 6 involves partial grandfathering to yield equity-value neutral-
ity. (As mentioned, one could also interpret these as carbon tax policies,
where policy 2 includes no inframarginal exemption and policy 6 involves
suﬃcient exemptions to preserve equity-value neutrality.) Column (2) of
table 2.5 shows that policy 2 causes equity values to fall by $4.9 billion in
the coal industry. This policy requires the ﬁrm to purchase $119 billion of
43. The real net-of-tax price of oil and gas is the only exogenous price in the model.
This price is assumed to increase at a rate of 2.7 percent per year (in keeping with baseline
assumptions employed by the Energy Modeling Forum at Stanford University). Hence, the
ratio of the (constant) real carbon tax rate to the (rising) net-of-tax price declines through
time. This explains why, in table 2.4, the percentage increase in the gross-of-tax price of oil
and gas declines after 2004.
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Table 2.4 Price Responses under Carbon Tax
2000 2001 2002 2004 2010 2025 2050
Coal industry
Gross of carbon tax output price 1.1769 1.360 1.546 1.551 1.560 1.570 1.570
Net of carbon tax output price 0.986 0.978 0.973 0.978 0.995 0.995 0.998
Crude petroleum and natural gas
industry
Gross of carbon tax output price 1.046 1.090 1.132 1.125 1.109 1.083 1.059
Net of carbon tax output price 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Note: Table shows ratio of price under policy change to reference-case price. Results are for policy 2, a $25 per ton
carbon tax with revenues recycled through reductions in personal income tax rates. Coal and oil and gas price re-
sponses are very similar under the other carbon tax policies.Table 2.5 Carbon Payments and Equity Values
Industry Equity Value Present (Fraction Present Present Value of
Value of Tax Value of Inframarginal
Diﬀerence of Payments Actual Exemption or
from Potential Exempted Carbon Grandfathered
Reference Carbon or Permits Payments Permits
Level Case Payments Grandfathered) [(1) (3)] [ (3)]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coal industry
Reference case 17.6 — — — — —
Standard carbon tax 12.7 4.9 119.5 — 119.5 —
(policy 2)







Oil and gas industry
Reference case 187.5 — — — — —
Standard carbon tax 178.0 9.5 65.8 — 65.8 —
(policy 2)







Note: Values in billions of year 2000 dollars. Values columns (4)–(6) are net of deductions to corporate and personal income taxes, as
indicated in equation (12).
carbon emissions permits. “Potential carbon payments” (col. [3]) is the
analog to the R rectangle: It is the permit price times the number of per-
mits employed in the coal industry. For the coal industry, this value is $119
billion. Under policy 2, all of the permits are in fact auctioned, and thus
the actual carbon payments are the same as the potential payments. Note
that this number is very large in relation to the reduction in equity values—
$4.9 billion—suﬀered by the industry. If only a small fraction of the $119
billion could be retained by ﬁrms, they would be compensated for the $4.9
billion loss. Under policy 6, ﬁrms can in fact retain a fraction of R. En-
abling ﬁrms to retain just 4.3 percent of the potential carbon payments is
worth an amount comparable to the $4.9 billion and prevents any reduc-
tion in equity values.
Thus, in the coal industry, a very small amount of grandfathering pre-
serves equity values. This reﬂects the fact that the potential tax payment
(the R rectangle) is large relative to the loss in equity value in the absence
of grandfathering. This, in turn, reﬂects the small share of cash ﬂow in
production cost and the large elasticity of supply, as discussed previously.
The result is similar in the oil and gas industry. However, in this industry
the potential carbon payments are not as large in relation to the loss of
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tion (15 percent) of these payments to suﬀer no loss of equity value.
While policy 6 preserves proﬁts in the fossil fuel industries, it does not
insulate all industries from negative impacts on proﬁts. The petroleum re-
ﬁning and electric utilities industries—which use fossil fuels (carbon) most
intensively—also endure noticeable losses of proﬁt and equity values, as
indicated by table 2.3. Protecting these industries would require expanded
policies involving additional instruments.44
Policies 7–9: Other Policies Involving Inframarginal Exemptions
The emissions permits policy just analyzed is one of many potential
policies that oﬀer inframarginal exemptions to the regulated ﬁrms. Before
investigating policies imposing tax-payment neutrality, it seems worth-
while to examine some related policies that grant inframarginal exemp-
tions from carbon taxation. Under policy 7 we consider the limiting case
where 100 percent of actual emissions are (inframarginally) exempt from
the carbon tax or, equivalently, where all emissions permits are grandfa-
thered. The results are shown in tables 2.2 and 2.3. Full grandfathering
leads to very large increases in equity values in the regulated industries—
especially the coal industry. These large increases are consistent with the
predicted magnitudes of the rents these policies generate and the associ-
ated increases in the discounted value of after-tax cash ﬂow.
We also consider some policies that oﬀer exemptions based on business-
as-usual (BAU) emissions. In particular, we examine the case where ﬁrms
receive exemptions from emissions corresponding to 50 or 90 percent of
their ﬁrst-period emissions in the unregulated situation. These simulations
diﬀer in two ways from the earlier experiments involving exemptions. First,
the exemptions are tied to BAU emissions rather than to the actual emis-
sions occurring under the new policy. Second, the exemptions are constant
through time. (In the earlier experiments, actual emissions tend to grow
with time, which means that the number of permits in circulation grows
as well.) Since we model a growing economy in which outputs of all indus-
tries tend to increase through time (even under a carbon tax), the exemp-
tion represents a diminishing percentage of actual output.
These policies (8 and 9) are less generous to ﬁrms than the policy involv-
ing 100 percent grandfathering, but more generous than policy 6, which
grandfathered just enough permits to assure equity-value neutrality. As
shown in table 2.3, oﬀering a permanent exemption equal to 50 percent of
44. One possible extension is to employ input subsidies for selected downstream industries.
Such a subsidy could insulate downstream users from higher fuel prices. We are grateful to
Ruud de Mooij for suggesting this option to us. Another possibility would be to give down-
stream users some of the carbon (fossil fuel) permits. This eﬀectively is a lump-sum transfer
to downstream users; such users could sell the permits to fossil fuel suppliers and earn reve-
nues that compensate them for the higher costs of fossil fuels.
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tive to the unregulated situation: Equity values rise by a factor of 7 in the
coal industry and by approximately 22 percent in the oil and gas industry.
A permanent exemption equal to 90 percent of ﬁrst-year BAU emissions
raises equity values by more than a factor of 12 in the coal industry and
by approximately 43 percent in the oil and gas industry. The government
forgoes more revenues under these policies than under policy 6; accord-
ingly, the eﬃciency costs of these policies are somewhat higher than under
policy 6.
2.6.3 Policies Achieving Tax-Payment Neutrality
Policy 10: Industry-Speciﬁc Cuts in the Corporate Income Tax
Policy experiments 10 and 11 invoke additional instruments (relative to
policy 2) to yield tax-payment neutrality for the coal, oil and gas, petro-
leum reﬁning, and electric utilities industries. In experiment 10, we intro-
duce industry-speciﬁc CIT cuts to achieve such neutrality, with a con-
straint that the CIT cuts cannot bring the industry’s tax rate below 0. It
turns out that this constraint is binding for the coal industry; under this
policy, the CIT rate for this industry reaches 0 before tax-payment neutral-
ity is achieved. This reﬂects the fact that this industry’s carbon tax pay-
ments are very large relative to CIT payments under the status quo. In the
oil and gas industry, tax-payment neutrality is achieved when the CIT rate
is lowered to 0.17 from its initial value of 0.42.
The CIT reductions that move toward tax-payment neutrality (in the
coal industry) or achieve such neutrality (in the oil and gas industry) are
much larger than the reduction necessary to achieve equity-value neutral-
ity (policy 4), and they imply extremely large increases in equity values
relative to the unregulated situation. The reason is as follows. As men-
tioned earlier, the “average” of short-, medium-, and long-run elasticities
of supply in the model is fairly high. Thus, overall, ﬁrms are able to shift
onto demanders a large fraction of the carbon tax. Because producers bear
only a small share of the tax burden, only a small CIT cut is needed to
undo the potential impact of a carbon tax on proﬁts and equity values. In
contrast, a CIT cut that achieves tax-payment neutrality vastly overcom-
pensates ﬁrms in terms of the real burden of the carbon tax to producers—
most of the tax is shifted onto consumers.
Policy 11: Industry-Speciﬁc Lump-Sum Transfers
When we maintain tax-payment neutrality through lump-sum recycling,
the eﬃciency costs are fairly high. As in the case with industry-speciﬁc
CIT cuts, lump-sum recycling substantially overcompensates ﬁrms in
terms of proﬁts and equity values. Again the reason is that most of the
carbon tax’s burden falls on demanders rather than suppliers. But the case

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.with lump-sum recycling is considerably more costly than the previous
case because it lacks the beneﬁcial inﬂuence on eﬃciency associated with
the cut in marginal CIT rates.
The eﬃciency costs, however, do not become as large as with full lump-
sum recycling to households (policy 1). The reason is that part of the lump-
sum transfers to ﬁrms are taxed away by the PIT on dividend income when
ﬁrms pay out these lump-sum transfers as dividends. Since the PIT rate
endogenously balances the government budget, the additional tax revenue
associated with the higher dividend income is returned to households in
the form of a lower PIT rate. In contrast, under full lump-sum recycling to
households (policy 1), the PIT rate stays constant.
It may be noted that ensuring tax neutrality through lump-sum transfers
doesnothavemuchconsequenceforindustry-speciﬁcoutput,employment,
and investment. Lump-sum transfers decouple interindustry allocation
from interindustry distribution.
These experiments indicate that imposing tax-payment neutrality sub-
stantially overcompensates ﬁrms. While equity concerns might justify
compensating ﬁrms for lost proﬁts or equity values, they seem to oﬀer little
justiﬁcation for tax-payment neutrality. The real-world backing for tax-
payment neutrality may stem from the misperception that leaving ﬁrms’
tax revenues unchanged is necessary to neutralize the real burden from
regulation.
2.6.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Table 2.6 indicates how key parameters aﬀect results under policies 1,
2, 6, and 7. Panel A of the table illustrates the implications of the size of
the carbon tax (or extent of abatement). Here we consider carbon tax rates
of $12.50 and $50.00, as well as the previously considered central-case
value of $25.00. Impacts on equity values increase with the size of the
carbon tax, but somewhat less than linearly. The results for the 100
percent-exemption case indicate that considerable rents are generated even
when the carbon tax is $12.50—in this situation, equity values in the coal
mining industry rise by almost a factor of six. Under all three policies,
eﬃciency costs per ton (or average abatement costs) increase as the carbon
tax rises from $12.50 to $50.00, attesting to rising marginal costs of abate-
ment. The eﬃciency rankings of the three policies do not change as the
carbon tax rate changes.
Panel B reveals the signiﬁcance of alternative values for elasticity of
demand for energy. The high-elasticity case involves a doubling in each
industry of the elasticities of substitution between the energy composite E
and the materials composite M, as well as the elasticity of substitution
among the speciﬁc forms of energy. The low-elasticity case halves each of
these elasticities in each industry. For the coal industry, the high-, central-,
and low-elasticity of substitution cases yield general equilibrium elastici-
Neutralizing Adverse Industry Impacts of CO2 Abatement Policies 77ties of demand of 0.26, 0.41, and 0.64, respectively, under policy 2. Under
every policy, the eﬃciency costs per ton of abatement are lower, the larger
the elasticity of demand. The eﬃciency rankings of policies remain invari-
ant across the various demand-elasticity scenarios. The numbers in paren-
theses in the columns associated with policy 6 are the proportion of emis-
sions permits required to achieve equity-value neutrality. In keeping with
the analysis of section 2.2, this proportion tends to rise with the elasticity
of demand.
Panel C examines the implications of alternative assumptions for the
elasticity of supply. We regulate this elasticity by altering the parameter 
in the adjustment cost function for each industry; see equation (A2) in
appendix A. This parameter determines the marginal adjustment cost,
which is inversely related to the elasticity of supply. The low-adjustment-
cost (high-elasticity-of-supply) case reduces this parameter by 25 percent
in all industries; the high-adjustment-cost (low-elasticity-of-supply) case
doubles it everywhere.45 Eﬃciency costs per ton do not vary substantially
with this parameter. As predicted by the analysis in section 2.2, the propor-
tion of emissions permits required to achieve equity-value neutrality rises
with adjustment costs (or falls with the elasticity of supply).
2.7 Conclusion
This paper indicates that the government can implement carbon abate-
ment policies and at the same time protect proﬁts in key industries without
substantial costs to the budget and thus to economy-wide eﬃciency. In
particular, the government has to grandfather only a small fraction of trad-
able pollution permits or exempt a small fraction of inframarginal emis-
sions from a carbon tax to protect the value of capital in industries that
are especially vulnerable to impacts from carbon taxes.
In the coal and oil and gas industries, initial cash ﬂow is fairly small in
relation to total cost. This small cost share contributes to a high supply
elasticity and the ability to shift a large share of the tax burden onto de-
mand. The ability to shift a signiﬁcant portion of the tax burden implies
that only a very small fraction of the potential rents associated with CO2
policies needs to be earmarked for the fossil fuel industries in order to
preserve proﬁts and equity values. These equity values can be safeguarded
through policies that depart only slightly from the most eﬃcient carbon
tax (or auctioned carbon permits) policies. The eﬃciency sacriﬁce is small.
The simplest programs involving freely allocated emissions permits or
inframarginal exemptions to the carbon tax protect only the fossil-fuel-
supplying industries; downstream industries are not protected. In our
model, the downstream industries that suﬀer the largest proportionate re-
45. We were unable to obtain a solution for the model when adjustment cost parameters
were reduced by more than 25 percent.
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industries. To protect these industries, other policy instruments would
need to be invoked. We ﬁnd that the potential carbon revenues are very
large in relation to the revenue that would be required to protect proﬁts in
the fossil fuel industries and the electric utilities and petroleum reﬁning
industries. As a result, in our simulations the proﬁts of this broader group
of energy industries can be protected at relatively small eﬃciency cost.
Some caveats are in order. First, our model’s aggregation may mask sig-
niﬁcant losses in some industries (such as aluminum manufacturing) that
are not explicitly identiﬁed. To protect these industries, additional com-
pensation methods would be required.
Second, our model assumes pure competition. If, in contrast, industries
producing fossil fuels already exercise considerable market power before
the carbon tax is introduced, they may have already enjoyed much or all
of the potential rents. In this case, CO2 abatement policies may be unable
to generate signiﬁcant additional rents, and thus the opportunities for
achieving equity-value neutrality at low cost may be considerably more
limited.
Third, in our model capital is the only factor that is not perfectly mobile.
To the extent that labor also is imperfectly mobile, there can be serious
transition losses from policy changes, and such losses may have signiﬁcant
political consequences. Overcoming barriers to political feasibility re-
quires attention to these losses.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the forces underlying the political
feasibility of CO2 abatement policies are complex. Protecting the proﬁts
of key energy industries may not be suﬃcient to bring about political feasi-
bility.
Notwithstanding these qualiﬁcations, the present analysis oﬀers signiﬁ-
cant hope that some major distributional concerns related to CO2 abate-
ment policies can be eliminated at low cost. Hence the price tag on remov-
ing key political obstacles to domestic CO2 abatement policies may be
lower than previously thought.
Appendix A
Structure of the Numerical Model
Production
Technology: General Features
Equations (1)–(3) of the text indicate the nested production structure.
The second term in equation (1) represents the loss of output associated
with installing new capital (or dismantling existing capital). Per-unit ad-
justment costs, 	, are given by




= − ξ 2
2
where I represents gross investment (purchases of new capital goods) and
 and  are parameters. The parameter  denotes the rate of economic de-
preciation of the capital stock. The production function for the oil and gas
industry, equation (4), contains the additional element f, which is a de-
creasing function of cumulative oil and gas extraction:
(A2) 1 gt t ZZ , [( / ) ] , =− ε
ε 1 2
where ε1 and ε2 are parameters, Zt represents cumulative extraction as of
the beginning of period t,a n dZ is the original estimated total stock of
recoverable reserves of oil and gas (as estimated from the benchmark
year).
The following equation of motion speciﬁes the evolution of Zt:
(A3) ZZ X tt t + =+ 1 .
Equation (A2) implies that the production function for oil and gas shifts
downward as cumulative oil and gas extraction increases. This addresses
the fact that as reserves are depleted, remaining reserves become more
diﬃcult to extract and require more inputs per unit of extraction.
Behavior of Firms
In each industry, managers of ﬁrms are assumed to serve stockholders
in aiming to maximize the value of the ﬁrm. The objective of ﬁrm-value
maximization determines ﬁrms’ choices of input quantities and investment
levels in each period of time.
The equation of motion for the ﬁrm’s capital stock is
(A4) KK I ss s + =− + 1 1 () . 
Household Behavior
Consumption, labor supply, and saving result from the decisions of an
inﬁnitely lived representative household maximizing its intertemporal util-
ity with perfect foresight. The model employs a nested utility function. In















where  is the subjective rate of time preference and U is the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution in full consumption. C is a CES composite
of consumption of goods and services C ˜ and leisure :
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where  is the elasticity of substitution between goods and leisure; and C
is an intensity parameter for leisure.
The variable C ˜ in equation (A6) is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of 17 com-
posite consumer goods:








where the C ˜,i(i  1 ,...,1 7 )a r ep a r ameters. The 17 types of consumer
goods are shown in table 2.1.
Consumer goods are produced domestically and abroad. Each compos-
ite consumer good Ci, i  1 ,...,1 7 ,i saC E Sa g g r e g a t eo fad o m e s t i c
and foreign consumer good of a given type:
(A8) CC D C F CC C
CC C =+ −  
  [( ) ] .
/ 1
1
In this equation, CD and CF denote the household’s consumption of do-
mestically produced and foreign-made consumer good of a given type at
a given point in time. The parameter C is related to C, the elasticity of
substitution between CD and CF, C  (C  1)/C. For simplicity, we
have omitted subscripts designating the type of consumer good and the
time period.
The household maximizes utility subject to the intertemporal budget
constraint given by the following condition governing the change in ﬁnan-
cial wealth, WK:
(A9) WK WK rWK YL GT p C tt t t t t t t + −= + + − 1 ˜ ˜ ,
where r is the average after-tax return on the household’s portfolio of ﬁ-
nancial capital, YL is after-tax labor income, GT is transfer income, and
p ˜ is the price index representing the cost to the household of a unit of the
consumption composite, C ˜.
Government Behavior
A single government sector approximates government activities at all
levels—federal, state, and local. The main activities of the government
sector are purchasing goods and services (both nondurable and durable),
transferring incomes, and raising revenue through taxes or bond issues.
Components of Government Expenditure
Government expenditure, G, divides into nominal purchases of nondu-
rable goods and services (GP), nominal government investment (GI), and
nominal transfers (GT):
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In the reference case, the paths of real GP, GI,a n dGT all are speciﬁed
as growing at the steady-state real growth rate, g. In simulating policy
changes, we ﬁx the paths of GP, GI,a n dGT so that the paths of real
government purchases, investment, and transfers are the same as in corre-
sponding years of the reference case. Thus, the expenditure side of the
government ledger is largely kept unchanged across simulations. This pro-
c e d u r ei se x p r e s s e db y
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where the superscripts P and R denote policy change and reference case
magnitudes, while pGP, pGI,a n dpGT are price indexes for GP, GI,a n dGT.
The price index for government investment, pGI, is the purchase price of
the representative capital good. The price index for transfers, pGT,i st h e
consumer price index. The index for government purchases, pGP, is deﬁned
in the next section.
Allocation of Government Purchases
GP divides into purchases of particular outputs of the 13 domestic in-
dustries according to ﬁxed expenditure shares:
(A12) Gi i i GP GPX p i , ,..., , == 11 3
where GPXi and pi are the quantity demanded and price of output from
industry i,a n dG,i is the corresponding expenditure share. The ideal price
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Parameter Values of the Numerical Model
Table 2B.1 Elasticities of Substitution in Production
Parameter
f g1 g2 E M x
Substitution margin g1g2 LKE ME components M components Domestic-foreign
inputs
Producing industry
1. Agricultural and noncoal 0.7 0.68 0.7 1.45 0.6 2.31
mining
2. Coal mining 0.7 0.80 0.7 1.08 0.6 1.14
3. Oil and gas extraction 0.7 0.82 0.7 1.04 0.6 (Inﬁnite)
4. Synthetic fuels 0.7 0.82 0.7 1.04 0.6 (Not traded)
5. Petroleum reﬁning 0.7 0.74 0.7 1.04 0.6 2.21
6. Electric utilities 0.7 0.81 0.7 0.97 0.6 1.0
7. Gas utilities 0.7 0.96 0.7 1.04 0.6 1.0
8. Construction 0.7 0.95 0.7 1.04 0.6 1.0
9. Metals and machinery 0.7 0.91 0.7 1.21 0.6 2.74
10. Motor vehicles 0.7 0.80 0.7 1.04 0.6 1.14
11. Miscellaneous 0.7 0.94 0.7 1.08 0.6 2.74
manufacturing
12. Services (except housing) 0.7 0.98 0.7 1.07 0.6 1.0
13. Housing services 0.7 0.80 0.7 1.81 0.6 (Not traded)
Table 2B.2 Parameters of Stock Eﬀect Function in Oil and Gas Industry
Parameter
Z0 Z ε1 ε2
Value 0 450 1.27 2.0
Note: This function is parameterized so that f approaches 0 as Z approaches Z; see equation
8. The value of Z is 450 billion barrels (about 100 times the 1990 production of oil and gas,
where gas is measured in barrel-equivalents). Z is based on estimates from Masters et al.
(1988). Investment in new oil and gas capital ceases to be proﬁtable before reserves are
depleted. The values of ε1 and ε2 imply that, in the baseline scenario, oil and gas investment
becomes 0 in the year 2050.
Parameter
 u 
Value 0.007 0.5 0.69 0.84
Table 2B.3 Utility Function Parameters
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This paper reveals that the eﬃciency costs of neutralizing the adverse
industry impact of CO2 abatement policies are rather low. The analysis
should be the starting point of a new research agenda to explore the sensi-
tivity of this result with respect to some important assumptions.
The Eﬃciency-Equity Trade-Oﬀ
The literature on environmental policy reveals that instruments that
charge a price for pollution—such as taxes or tradable pollution permits—
induce smaller eﬃciency costs than non-revenue-raising instruments. In
addition to the fact that economic instruments equalize marginal abate-
ment costs, there is a second-best argument that underpins this result. In
particular, environmental policy that raises revenue induces a revenue-re-
cycling eﬀect: The revenues from the environmental policy can be used to
reduce other distortionary taxes. Accordingly, revenue-raising instruments
are attractive from an eﬃciency point of view (Goulder, Parry, and Bur-
traw 1997).
In contrast, revenue-raising instruments are typically unattractive from
a political perspective. Indeed, by assigning the property rights of the envi-
ronment to the government, these instruments redistribute income away
from polluters and toward the government. This reduces the political via-
bility of environmental policy. To avoid adverse distributional eﬀects, the
government may compensate the regulated agents through its revenue-
recycling strategy, provided that it has the appropriate instruments avail-
able. Recent literature has indeed emphasized how the revenues from envi-
ronmental taxes can be used to neutralize the distributional consequences
of environmental taxes on households (Metcalf 1998). The study by Bo-
venberg and Goulder (henceforce BG) focuses on the distributional impli-
cations of CO2 abatement policies applied to ﬁrms. In particular, BG ex-
plore the implications for industry proﬁts and equity values that seem to be
the most natural indicators for the distributional impact of CO2 abatement
policies on ﬁrms.
Availability of Instruments
BG consider diﬀerent instruments to neutralize distributional eﬀects.
First, they analyze industry-speciﬁc corporate income taxes and industry-
speciﬁc lump-sum transfers. It is straightforward to see how these instru-
ments can neutralize the disproportional equity eﬀects on speciﬁc indus-
tries. However, one may doubt the relevance of this approach since such
instruments are typically not available in practice. For instance, industry-
Ruud A. de Mooij is a senior research fellow of the Research Center for Economic Policy
(OCFEB) at the Erasmus University Rotterdam and heads the European Comparative Anal-
ysis unit at CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
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den in many countries, while corporate income taxes are generally not
diﬀerentiated across industries. A more promising strategy, therefore, is the
third instrument explored by BG, namely, the grandfathering of pollution
permits (or the introduction of tax exemptions). A highly relevant and
surprising result from the BG analysis is that the government has to grand-
father only a very small fraction of tradable pollution permits to protect
the value of capital in the most vulnerable industries. Furthermore, this
neutralization involves only small eﬃciency costs. This is an important
conclusion for policymakers. Many countries consider the introduction of
environmental taxes or tradable pollution permits. However, governments
are generally reluctant to impose these policies due to the disproportional
impact on particular industries.
Grandfathering and Entry Barriers
The intuition behind the BG result can be summarized as follows. Re-
stricting output of a particular industry creates scarcity rents. Indeed,
whereas a single ﬁrm in the industry may not have market power, a govern-
ment that restricts total sector output exploits the monopoly power of the
industry as a whole. Accordingly, all ﬁrms in the sector beneﬁt. The eﬃ-
ciency costs associated with this output restriction are borne by the con-
sumers of the commodity in terms of a higher consumer price.
Scarcity rents can be created by grandfathered emissions permits or
pollution-control instruments. Notice that scarcity rents can be main-
tained only if the policy applies to existing ﬁrms alone. Without this re-
striction, new ﬁrms would enter the market to share the rents from freely
issued permits, thereby causing economy-wide pollution to rise to the level
before the regulation was imposed. Hence, the scarcity rents originate in a
barrier for new ﬁrms to enter the market.1
As explained by Fullerton and Metcalf (1999), revenue-raising environ-
mental-policy instruments tax away the scarcity rents from the regulated
sector. BG propose a hybrid system in which part of the scarcity rents are
held privately while the residual part ﬂows to the government (to be used
for revenue recycling).
Input versus Output Taxes
BG consider a tax that is imposed on the suppliers of fossil fuels. This
choice is attractive if one seeks a solution for the adverse eﬀects on equity
values in the coal and the oil and gas industries. Indeed, a tax exemption
(or grandfathered emissions permits) compensates the industry on which
1. BG (n. 33) mention that environmental tax revenues from ﬁrms in Denmark and the
Netherlands are earmarked for technology subsidies to the same industries. These targeted
subsidies do not apply to existing ﬁrms alone. However, by phasing out these subsidies in
subsequent years, the risk of entry is limited.
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value, such as energy-intensive ﬁrms that face higher factor prices, cannot
be compensated through such exemptions. In the BG simulations, these
industries are therefore compensated through industry-speciﬁc corporate
income tax reductions or lump-sum transfers. If such instruments are not
available, the adverse impact on the equity value of the energy-intensive
industries may impose an important political problem.
BG could alternatively consider a tax imposed on energy inputs, rather
than a tax on energy supply. In that case, exemptions or grandfathered
emissions permits would create rents for the industries that demand fossil
fuels since, in aggregate, these industries would exploit their monopsony
power and reduce the before-tax price of energy. Accordingly, the govern-
ment would have access to an instrument that directly compensates in-
dustries that demand energy, although it would lose its instrument to com-
pensate the energy-supplying industries. This may be an interesting case.
Indeed, political debates in Europe—an energy importer—have been
dominated by concerns about the energy-intensive industries rather than
energy suppliers. Exemptions or grandfathered emissions permits on en-
ergy inputs may result in a politically acceptable CO2 policy for the bulk
of heterogeneous industries that demand energy. For energy-importing
countries, this compensation may even be suﬃcient since energy-supplying
ﬁrms—who bear the burden of this policy—are located abroad.
Border-Tax Adjustments
BG assume that exports of energy are exempt from the CO2 tax, while
imports are taxed. In the presence of these border-tax adjustments, tax
exemptions create rents because the energy supplier can diﬀerentiate its
output price between domestic and foreign consumers. Indeed, the scar-
city rents originate in a higher before-tax output price in the domestic
market. If there were no border-tax adjustments, energy-producing ﬁrms
could no longer diﬀerentiate between domestic and foreign consumers;
both would be charged the world-market price. In that case, non-revenue-
raising instruments will hardly raise the output price and thus do not cre-
ate scarcity rents. Accordingly, the exemptions necessary to compensate
the energy-supplying ﬁrms would be much higher than in the BG simula-
tions.
For energy-intensive industries, it would be more diﬃcult to impose
border-tax adjustments since the government would require information
about the carbon content of products with foreign origin. In case of an in-
put tax on energy without border-tax adjustments, however, it is diﬃcult
to compensate the energy-intensive industries through tax exemptions. In-
deed, domestic industries will generally exert only little monopsony power
on the international market for energy inputs. My guess is that exemptions
88 A. Lans Bovenberg and Lawrence H. Goulder(or the fraction of grandfathered permits) would thus have to be very large
to compensate these industries for the loss in equity value.
A Future Research Agenda
The paper by BG should be the starting point of a new research agenda
on how the disproportional industry impact of CO2 abatement policies can
be neutralized at the least cost to eﬃciency. In my view, this is a promising
research area that is highly relevant for the policy debate. To better under-
stand the impact of diﬀerent neutralization options, it may be helpful to
develop small stylized models, in addition to the applied model used by
BG. In addition, researchers may perform similar analyses using diﬀerent
models. Accordingly, they may test the robustness of the results and under-
stand the crucial parameters that determine the magnitude of the eﬀects.
In this connection, I would also like to encourage BG to explore alternative
policy proposals, in addition to the experiments analyzed in this paper.
Furthermore, an extensive sensitivity analysis may reveal the most impor-
tant elasticities that require further empirical investigation.
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